5 Conclusion - the Way Forward

5.1   Addressing the Euro Crisis
Interestingly, the main monetary supervising bodies are all in a way 'latin controlled'. The ECB by Mario Draghi, the IMF by  Christine Lagarde, and the OECD by Angel Gurria. This is in line with the established chracteristic of latin policy to create in the first place hierarchical top down structures.
Its main result is likely that northern countries are brought under southern control mechanisms, and as such will be progressively deprived of their national funds.
At this stage they are already forced to cut substantially on their internal expenditures. Both northern and southern parties are in some deadlock position, as the northern countries do not want the outfall of southern countries out of the eurozone, while they fear a still deeper crisis. Apparently, it is hoped for, that short term financial measures will help or longlasting macro-economic effects will take care.
However, fear might be a bad advisor. For southern countries will continue for a long time to wrestle and regain confidence of moneylenders.  What evidently has been lacking from the start in the eurozone is a viable economic automatism. Although one might consider as such the interest rates for lending money by states, this mechaniism did not work in time, and fails nowadays, because of the worsened financial and economic situation some countries are in. Only timely awareness of the bad developments in progress could have prevented this.
In general, if a certain policy is budgetary negative, it should, by itself, immediately be redressed by financial disadvantages, and vice versa. However, for the time being, the main solution, emerging through statements from various politicians, is to transfer more power to Brussels, so Brussels can exert financial power over the member states, and facilitate north-south money flows. As the present situation will lead to major transfers of money, much distrust and economic loss of vigilance, especially in the north, will go along with these suggested proposals. Not the least, while Brussels is known for its lack of modesty itself.
The skipping of the indispensable acculturation phase with real life double currency, and its resulting monetary instability, will leave a long trace of economic disorder in the world. Not the least, while it is worsened by the uninvolved attitude of Brussels, and the fundamental misinterpretation of its role under these extraordinary circumstances..

5.2   The Stalemate Situation
History shows, that power approaches as proposed by Brussels should be the end of a long process of habituation, and practiced only as a last resort, As such, top-down approaches may easily evolve into a major internal conflict between those who support the power, and those who are being controlled and suffer the harsh consequences. In the worst case, resulting populism may demand for war, bringing Europe centuries back in history.. In the best case, the northern countries are being deprived of their own funding, while the southern countries still face unbearable budgetary control..
The mechanism, that has been proposed before the very start of the single currency, is to adopt, at least for the time to come, the double currency, actually being in place, and not the 1999-2002 quasi variant. Each country would have kept its own currency, while the euro would facilitate the common market, and each country would consistently try to match its own currency to the euro. Especially the British delegation foresaw the unbalanced situation of the present, and kept urging its advantages, but was downplaid in a questionable manner..
If having adopted the double currency solution, every participating country would have had the benefit of access to the common currency, while the money market would stabilize the monetary system through the ratios of domestic vs. common currency. An automatic economic market mechanism, that would have avoided misuse and abuse, and favored stability of the common currency..
In the present situation, we have to envisage, that at a certain point in time, the northern countries may not be able to spend money anymore to address the financial, econoimic and political incompatibilities of the eurozone. I.e., without doing serious harm to their own economies and societies. Already, this situation has started, also by those who have a direct interest, such as neighboring countries of the Eurozone, but not being a member yet. Furthermore, the euro is gradually loosing its value through inflation, so impoverishing is akready on the way..
This is in line with the weak countries of the eurozone, that have demonstrated a long history of devaluating their monetary systems. As a consequence, the euro will also devaluate trying to keep them in, without proper measures. For the ECB is buying their inflated bonds at enormous cost paid by the northern countries, unavoidably leading to devaluation.. The crucial issue for the northern countries already is - will our econiomies be able to survive, or will we also be dragged down by the southern countries.
Politics in alltime history is primarily governed by the well-known process of  'muddling through'. Seldomly, drastic solutions are accepted, such as banning countries from the Common Market would imply. One may expect, that the way the euro crisis will evolve is going worse in a step by step manner, hardly visible.  Even if many people know that no salvation whatever is to be expected in the future, it is political preference to deal with problems on a day-by-day basis.
That way the eventual downfall will show to be gradual, yet unavoidable. A clear sign on the wall of the attitude to be expected, is in the exorbitant EU-salaries. These are still not moderated  by the budgetary problems of its member states, and even trying to expand. A painfully uninvolved attitude, that clarifies beyond belief its unrelated position to the European nations, and their economies.
Therefore, we cannot expect European politicians to intervene in any rational manner, as banks would do in the case of a firm on the brink of bankruptcy. Nor may we expect sustainable solutions to be introduced by Brussels, such as introducing a double currency, or a split of northern and southern economies in two monetary blocks.
The EU in its haste to adopt monetary solutions has turned sour, and the European dream is converting into a nightmare.The biggest currency gamble of all-time history, introducing the euro, has failed beyond imagination. Its main cause lying in overlooking the rationale, that modern economies develop and strive bottom-up. Contrariwise, the proposed EU-measures are still top-down. Thus failing to support, and even harm, the basic economic mechanisms for prosperity; internal and external of the Eurozone. The European Central Bank is actually buying and piling up worthless debt paper of southern countries at immense cost,  paying with invaluable northern investment money. - making the ECB a euro trash can, that stands in the way of progress. The EU will gradually paralyze for many years to come all of its economies, not only in the northern Eurozone, but also in the southern one. Economies of a large part of the world will suffer as a result.
A sustainable way out is reintroducing former currencies next to the euro in those countries, that are too weak to keep up.with the northern countries. Thus providing the automatic mechanism that solves monetary inconsistencies. Furthermore, the EU is nowadays unable to control its own budget, failing to divert superfluous activities back to member states, while still attracting new tasks. It also cannot control its own salaries, although asking for drastic budgettary cost cutting measures of the member states.
The EU is in effect becoming a uncontrollable moloch, next to a Development Agency for southern states. The northern states, such as the UK, The Netherlands, Germany, and the Scandinavian countries, including Finland, are in an urgent need of an independent agency. It should monitor and direct closely all of the tranfers of money to the south. If only for preventing a large part of the world from a longlasting depression.
 
5.3 The Solution
Let us remind the predominant EU-basics. Next to its primacy of EU-law, and its voluntary conferral by the EU member states, the EU boasts subsidiarity and proportionality. The latter principles state (1) that decisions are made at the lowest possible level, and (2) that decisions are only made to the extent necessary to achieve the objectives.
Regarding the monetary crisis and its long aftermath, it has become obvious, that two conflicting groups of interests in the EU have been disregraded. On the one hand a group of states has pretty much tried to control within acceptable limits their budgets throughout the euro period, while on the other hand states have adopted the freedom to deviate to a substantial extent from balanced income-expenditure ratios.The result is now, that within the EU a group of states can be considered 'nursing states', and another group 'suffering states'. Shortly, N-states, and S-states.
No proper decision-making body did represent neither N-one, nor the other S-group.of states. Nevertheless, from 2003 on, both groups did show diverging financial measures or non-measures to their economies, that gradually split the monetary union. (The foregoing three year quasi double currency period (1-1-1999 - 1-1-2002) - lacking real life comparison of currencies - did nothing to make the European population aware of the problem). Huge debts emerged, leading to an ever-growing economic disharmony in the eurozone. To redress this ongoing situation both groups of interests should be represented by an official council, so the problem can be settled in a stable and orderly manner.
To better understand the issue at stake, one should for a moment consider a fully imaginary situation, in which the US and Mexico were to decide on a common political bond, comparable to the EU. It will be obvious that both nations would, for a long time to come, need to keep their own existing authority levels, especially in the realms of finance. However, in the EU this particular level is missing and for a large part to be blamed for the present problem situation. As such, adequate competence failed at high EU-level. What should such an authority level look like?

In the EU nursing states and suffering states shall each have a Council of of Monetary Interests (sometimes shortly to be referred to as CMI's, resp. N-CMI and S-CMI)  representing both groups of states.

Each CMI shall discuss and decide upon its monetary issues.

Each CMI will meet at least semiannual, or more frequently as monetary developments of the group and outside require.

Each CMI consists of one representative of each participant state, if so-wished to be accompanied by one aide.

Each decision by a CMI is binding for the explicit period the decision is to cover, and is immediately published.and forwarded to the Chairman of the European Central Bank, who must implement the decision.

If decisions of both CMI's do conflct, the decision of the Nursing Council of Monetary Interests will prevail.

All decisions regarding monetary issues made by both Councils are binding to all EU-institutaions.

Both CMI's can invite an observer of the other Council or from the outside during one of its meetings.

Each CMI will have a secretariat and pemanent geographic seat. The N-CMI in Aachen, Germany. The S-CMI in Venice, Italy.

The N-CMI consists of representatives of EU-states that have less than 60% debt of their GDP, and less than 3% budget deficit, for the last three years.

The S_CMI consists of representatives of EU-states that exceeds 60% debt of their GDP, and more than 3% budget deficit, for the last three years.

Voting in CMI's is unanimously, unless otherwise explicitly stated.

Each CMI is exempt from any decision taken by any EU-institution or any participant state on monetary matters.

Natural members of each CMI are determined by each state in advance of any meeting.

A chairman of each CMI is chosen out of their midst, with a simple majority of votes, for the maximum duration of one year.

If no agreement is reached in putting forward a CMI-chairman, the alphabetical order of the participant state names is followed.

The chairman prepares the agenda of each meeting, having consulted all participants at least fourteen days in advance.

Members are convocated for each meeting, at least one week in advance, which convocation must be acknowledged and notified back to the secretariat of the CMI.

If a member is absent in a CMI-meeting no final decision is made. A provisional decision is sent to all CMI-members, and can be made permanent if all CMI-mmbers underwrite the decision. If no unamous underwriting is arrived at, a new meeting has to be concocated concerning the decision at stake.

If a member fails to attend a meeting two consecutive times without notice, this member is expelled from the CMI..

* The Eurozone states ratio of public debt to GDP (Eurostat 2010) are:
Estonia 6.6
Luxembourg 18.4
Slovenia 38.0
Slovakia 41.0
Finland 48.4
Spain 60.1
Cyprus 60.8
Netherlands 62.7
Malta 68.0
Austra 72.3
France 81.7
Germany 83.2
Portugal 93.0
Ireland 96.2
Belgium 96.8
Italy 119.0
Greece 142.8

How could the state economies of Europe be alleviated and focussed on the future?
The following suggestions seem to be quite obvious, but it may be useful to memorize them. First of all, it is highly necessary to provide the younger generations with a proper sustainable future. The first aim should be to make use of the dynamics of youth, instead of the Laura Dekker type of bashing and expulsion out of Europe. The second aim should be to put reserve sums of the elderly into economic investments, instead of redistributing them over the population at large as recently has happened.
The capital thus brought to life in the form of tax relief should be garanteed by the authorities, so it will flow back to its lenders with a modest interest in due time.
Money from these funds can be borrowed on tentative, but expected sound entrepreneurship, by means of a feasible plan. The general outcome should be such, that surviving enterprises outperform failing ones by at least 70% after the start up and taking up period of three years. Crash courses, i.e. courses that are intense, of short duration, and ending with a tough test, should provide for emerging deficiences in entrepreneural knowledge.
Programs that are feasible, convincing, and aim to meet ecological-energysaving objectives should particularly be welcomed, then, if necessary accepting a higher risk level, and lower threshold of approval. Monitoring all approved programs should produce statistics on success rates vs. failure rates, counting in start up set backs, and a slow taking up of speed. Counseling reports should be produced  at the first signs of deviation from the plan, but be restricted in contact, and mostly be exercised by way of the courses already mentioned.
Th type of projects that are likey to be approved, could be solar panels, that closely fit roof tiles, but do not interfere with the general appearance of traditional buildings. Actually, all existing houses should be made energy-neutral. A very demanding, but feasible option for the next decade. Also, making optimal use of tidal streams or other water flows, within economic reach of electricity consumption, should be taken seriously, if test experiments show its viability. Furthermore, if someone can demonstrate safe transfer of inductive energy from the infrastructure to vehicles, such a proposed application deserves close attention.
A crucial judgement criterium is - will there be demand for the product or product range. This demand may be currently at hand, but may also be latent and to be expected in the (near) future. If there is, a modus operandi has to be demonstrated how supply of the demand is safeguarded in an optimal economic way.
Plans that are not beyond the level of ideas, or even still described in general goals, should be rejected, but might stay in the pipeline, waiting for the outcomes of a convincing experiment or test if the applicant has the necessary qualifications to take the idea further.
To be chosen by the applicant, each project should have a small counseling group of elderly entrepreneurs or qualified advisors, assisted by a secretary to report on the project progress.