1 The Euro Crisis

1.1  A Current, but Problematic Solution to the Euro Crisis
This concise note on the Eurocrisis aims to highlight some disregarded, yet fundamental cultural differences. These affected the euro currency from the very start. For instance, southern countries prefer since ancient times indirect taxatiion (immediately related to expenditures). Northern countries are more likely to tax incomes and fortunes.The euro crisis did originate mostly in the participating southern countries of Europe. Why did it happen that way, and that soon after its implementation, and why could northern countries not prevent the disastrous and long lasting consequences?
As ususal, the road to disaster was actually paved by the so-called 'muddling through' decision making pattern, which is well-known to politics all over the world, and in all times. Now that Europe tries to scramble out of the present-day deep crisis, a better understanding of major issues involved, may facilitate lasting solutions. The importance of which is predominant, because not only weak economies in the Eurozone are troubled, but actually all the countries that participate in the Eurozone.
The presentday solution of 9 sepetember 2012, by the Euriopean Central Bank, is to use the ESM-budget to buy bonds of the indebted weak countries. This policy is used as a means of lowering the interest rates these countries have to pay on the money market. However, this approach is shortlived and entails a severe risk of lengthening the crisis indefinitely. Nout Wellink, former chairman of the Dutch National Bank  argues in a newspaper interview, that the ECB in the end will have bonds, which banks and other investors want to get rid of. As such, the result will be, that the ECB is saddled with lots of debt paperrs no-one wants to have. It is as if the ECB is putting a pistol on its own head, leading to its demise. However, the ECB cannot stop its help to countries, even to those, that will not do enough to cut down expenses. As a result, it will inflate the weak countries, but also its own stock of paper. Thus, Weidman, the president of the German National Bank announced himself against those ECB politics. Others considered the conditions set for buying bonds enough garantee. Yet, time and again, it remains to be seen whether these conditions will be applied effectively, and not be mitigated in time. The prospects in the latter sense are dim, given proven evidence of the past. 

1.2   The Eurozone and Euro as Perceived
Some figures highlight clearly the Eurozone, as it is perceived these days. 57% of the Europeans in twelve European countries regard the euro to be bad for the economy. The figure reflectis a growth of 4% of the same interview one year ago. Moreover, countries without the euro regard the single currency as very bad. For instance, 89% of the British. The Swedes amount to 84% (while still obliged to introduce the euro!), and the Poles a still impressive 71%. These extremely high figures are alarming. Even in eurozone countries see their population resistance grow. In Germany and Spain a quarter of the population wants their country to leave the euro (Transatlantic Trends, june 2012).
Except for the latter two, the countries abovementioned, are not yet in the eurozone, but have a real prospect for entering. They can be considered to be independent, but important bystanders, as they are particularly interested lookers-on. To say the least, we may expect those countries not to enter the eurozone for a long time to come. Nowadays, the atrractiveness of the single currency can be considered outspoken negative. Some very basic problems have to be solved first. Yet, as history shows, solving such problems will take many years, not given violent conflict.

1.3   The Consequences of a Troublesome Start
In this restricted context, no effort will be made to discuss all elements involved. Its only aim is to highlight some ignored issues concerning the emergence of the euro, and the effects on the continuation of its major crisis. It will be argued, that the introduction of the euro single currency in 2002 was already accompanied by fundamental problems and characteristics, that go back far in history, and can be noticed for centuries..Basically reflecting conflicting issues, which did not disappear, but actually grew worse in the past decade.
The decision was taken in 1992 at the Maastricht Treaty, to introduce the single currency, eventually to be named the euro. The specimen itself came into use the first of january 2002 in 12 countries of the European union; later expanded with 5 more. It meeant a superfically smooth start, but apparently troublesome after a couple of years.The first signs must have been showing early, as I asked already in 2003 the Terneuzen artist Cees van Langevelde to make me a painting according to Dali's mediterranean 'watch'. Dali sought to express in a famous painting the cultural differences of north and south (when Dali returned home after three active months abroad, he found that nothing had been done by his friends during his own very active absence in the US)..

Many countries stepped into the eurozone obviously hoping to grasp the benefits within reach. However, at the time many did not realize, that the northern type of ruling of the euro, would be considered consistently different by southern parties. It should be stressed that in this context 'north', and 'south' are loosely defined concepts, that cover stronger, versus weaker approaches to the original euro currency basics..
Furthermore, it needs to be argued, that the British sharply foresaw the severe consequences of a single currency, that have emerged during its existence. Yet, the British delegation was not part of the decisive overnight decisive meeting. In the absence of the British delegation the single currency was adopted by the others. In retrospection, deceptively too rash a decision was taken. It created the conditions for a fundamental derailing of the euro from the very start..
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