4 Uncomfortable Options

4.1   No Easy Way Out of the Crisis
In a civilized world debt has to be paid back by the party that borrowed, whether it concerns money that is owed by a person, by a firm, by a multinational or by a country. Thus, in principle loans are only granted to people or firms, who are considered credit worthy. For instance, by having more income than expenditures, or being convincingly solvent, and expecting to create more income in the future.
It is highly unusual, for debts to be paid for by those, who are not at all involved.in the origins of the debt. Yet, the latter situation emerges painfully from the euro crisis. Northern countries have pursued their strict way of bookkeeping, while southern counrtries practised their indigenous financial approach. Northern countries consider the latter far too lenient to be sustainable. In the situation of the single currency, it did prove to be a disastrous cultural gap. Particularly so, while the basic deviation was rather misty for a couple of  years, and uncovered too late. Several solutions to the euro crisis have been proposed. Yet, none seems to be taking into account the ongoing and lasting basic cultural differences in Europe, that will influence the outcomes, whatever measures are taken in the near future.
One should realize, that deep cultural differences between northern and southern countries affect the basic agreements, because of the underlying conflicting opinions and convictions regarding an agreement. They also affect the deviating way agreements are applied. Thus, intended courses of action will turn out completely different, whether viewed from a northern, or viewed from a southern standpoint.
Most of the time, the adopted 'official' focus is on the initial agreement and its ruling. However, this is a typical northern approach. It is acceptable in its rigidity to northern delegates. However,  usually considered a first opinion to their southern counterparts.

4.2   Three Options
For solving the crisis, three courses of action might be pursued. First of all, the power option. Mainly by concentrating monetary and political power centrally in Brussels and international supervising bodies. In so doing, it is assumed, that the economic deviating countries are forced back to redress their attitudes, at the same time transferring huge sums of money from the north to the south.. As such, it represents a typical hierarchical top-down approach, well-known from ages back, and not to be disregarded in its deep roots.
In the past, when Europe was largely controlled by the legions of hte Roman Empire, and much later in a double sense by the well-established Roman Church next to the Spain Monarchy, a top-down control was established. A hierarchical structure did take care of important economic issues. Predominantly, by maintaining a money flow to the power center, while at the same time keeping the countries from aberrations. Again it is an intended  European policy, that will pursue central domination, evolving step by step.
To be expected from the proposed measures, is a process that is comparable to a complementos approach, as elaborated on in 3. Initially, northern countries will not disregard their interests, but along the road be overwhelmed by events. A pattern results, that will show a succession of postponements. Only to be implemented one by one, whenever the crisis worsens, and  another need for intervention emerges. Adaptations to the original ruling will each time create a new framework of reference, that is coined to provide a new next start. However, eventually, as history shows, some limit will be arrived at, and a major cultural clash is likely to result. That might lead to the unavoidable conviction, that northern and southern regional interests should be separated in part or in total..
As a typical example, this pattern is showing in Belgium, where north and south present a struggle very similar to the European issue, be it of course on a far smaller scale. The solution presents itself in separate autonomous governments, and separate budgets. Along such a line of development, Europe may eventually survive as two distinct, yet closely related parts. But before such a durable situation is the inevitable outcome, the ongoing crisis and its 'solutions' have to last long and worsen all participating economies substantially.
The breakup situation will be reached, when people in the north are likely to say - to this very point and no further. It is likely to occur, and can be expected as the firsrt signs show. It has been articulated alraedy tentatively within the Eurozone by the Constitutional Court of Germany, and the german political party of CSU. Other clear signs on the wall, are the earlier quoted opnions of those European countries, that did not join the Eurozone yet.
Contrary to the presentday centralized  power suggestions, is the original and authentic northern bottom-up approach, as proposed by the British. It basically entails the provision of a common market with a common currency to facilitate internal money flows. The common currency provides  at the same time externally, a substantive, stable, and regognized world coin. However, and for the time being, without the loss of the trusted home currencies.
Such a proces provides an automatic economic mechanism to the European monetary system. The existing currencies stay in place, while the double currency monetary system gradually smoothes out cultural differences.between the home currency and the common market currency. I.e., until a state of equilibrium is arrved at, making home currencies superfluous, so they disappear..
Because of the  nationally expressed relationships of home currencies to the common currency, the money market regulates the differing values through its demand/suppply mechanisms. Thus, the proper relation of the different economies to the common currency is provided intrinsically, and not through questionable intervention from above. If that model would have been pursued, the weak southern economies would successfully have brought cheaper products on the common and world market through their devaluated home currency, but with the outlook for automatically strengthening their economies.to the general level.
As argued, at the preliminary stage of the euro the double currency was a viable option, and strongly suggested by the British. Had it been adopted, the euro crisis would not have resulted, because of that automatic economic mechanisms, accompanied only by peripheral ruling to avoid derailing and excesses. However, presentday politics are still seeking a single currency solution aiming for a power option. In open democratic societies, as most European states favor, the power option is not going to work indefinitely. The drawbacks will soon dominate the doubtful benefits.
We still may hope for the double currency to be introduced in the Eurozone, curing deviations in internal monetary terms, and facilitating the joining in of new members. Yet, we must also fear that much depletion of all eurozone economies will have to show first, before such an implementation is likely to occur. Although the suggested centralized approach is counterforcing modern economic automatisms, it will be hard for Brussels to accept moderation of its role.
A third option keeps the northern and southern monetary systems apart. In a way introducing both of the earlier approaches, but separately. A northern central bank and a southern central bank each have their own common currency, That option has been referred to as Neuro and Zeuro. The weaker countries introduce their familiar top-down monetary system, while the stronger economies operarte their own bottom-up model. Such a system prevents balancing money flows from the north to the south; and instead favors the cultural differences of both economic regions.  .

4.3   The Expected Development - Muddling Through
Evidently, current European policy is to go the southern road. In practical terms, it pursues the ´muddling through´ way of makimg policy. While the top-down approach is preferred by Brussels, it is likely to prove not longlasting, as its gaining of poltical power is matched by ever poorer economic results. The power option will create major problems in many participating nations, north and south, and will prevent others from entering. Proper economic solutions are avoided, as long as small incrental measures are accepted.
It would be inappropriate to blame politicians for going along their road. Especially, as precise knowledge of alternatives is lacking. In reality, most arguments being vague and not in numerical monetary terms. Moreover, alternatives also show sharp differences between short term and long term consequences. In democratic systems, politicians usually have a short term responsibility, so their scope is determined by their election period. They may be gone, when serious conflicts arise.
On solid grounds we may expect, that the centralized power option will not cure the euro crisis. Its effect is assumed to be a constant flow of money from the north, to be transferred. It evaporates their economies, while not curing the southern ones, and only loading them with debts they cannot pay back. Because of the step-by-step policies, this process will take many years until the eventual downfall of the eurozone, because of the huge sums involved. It will keep a large part of Europe, and also a part of the world, in some crisis situation. Only if an unsurmountable barrier shows, the process may stall suddenly as uncontrollable political pressures explodes bottom-up.