History does not repeat itself; however, politicians do

Eminent Harvard historian, contemporary and friend of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Hendrik Willen van Loon wrote in 1927: The Story of America,. Not only displaying his phenomenal knowledge of history in general, but using it as the sound foundation of explaining the growth and power of the USA. 
During the last decade, Europe has tried to copy the American example, obviously without reading or understanding The Story of America. 
In a nutshell, which are the terrible mistakes that could have prevented the grand European failure of its monetary system and of the worsening Eurocrisis?

A short reflection on the American story might be helpful to those who are willing to learn as Americans do, as even nowadays they still consult van Loon. He is  favored as the basic source of understanding history and especially the European and American history. Which is no wonder as he writes clearly, yet profoundly, mastering all available sources.
The recurrent main themes of the American story are centralization and spirit. Not as conjoining forces, but as conflicting powers at the opposite ends of an ongoing struggle. Centralization is sought after by the Aristocrats, while the frontier spirit is the everlasting prime economic drive of the nation, all the time desperately trying to relieve itself of too much of a centralized control. The Aristocrats, boasting centralization, have a forceful weapon in money lending, while the frontier men resist any growth of faraway control, that deprives them of their energy.
Centralization may silently build up evergrowing resistance. In the end, strong revolutionary counterforces to centralization are well-known to explode unexpectedly. For instance, France in the seventeenth century was rapidly degenerating into an overcentralized monarchy .. as van Loon describes the preceding developments towards the uncontrolled outburst of revolution. As such, the office of President might easily develop, as van Loon puts it, into a new way of establishing monarchy (i.e. in the bad sense).
As long as Europe is considered a mere common market during the second half of the last century, anyone in its realm feels, and is, a winner. This is because of the best use of the capitalistic system, which van Loon puts as a system .. accused of many highly and diversified crimes .. but even its worst enemies cannot accuse it of laziness or deny that in times of crisis it is able to develop an almost supernational energy. However, for no apparent and sensible reason, centralized forces begin, from 2000 on, to get the European Common Market in its premature and tragic grip.
Is it that 'southern' forces want control over the Northern member states, especially over their finances? Eliminating the huge difference in currency risk, by introducing a single euro. As van Loon states about a similar historic process ..  by every means, both fair and foul, ...  trying to recapture for the benefit of an Italian despot.
Whatever its reasoning, it did arrange its centralizing mechanism in a most peculiar way - the creation of debt. Not by lending money, but by spending money. That is, a vehicle is established, that disguises spending (actually overspending,  as it is not being justified by income). In so doing a smoke screen is draped over a single currency, called the Euro. While in the past 'southern' currencies are devaluated whenever their income does not match their expenditure, from now on they are part of a currency which is keeping its value through the (unaware) support of the non-devaluating states. It provides a currency that for a long time will stay unhampered, whatever the inconsistent explosions of 'southern' expenditures. Borrowing is easy on the international money market at modest non-southern interest rates.
Until of course the economic world crisis of 2008 makes money lenders think twice. How about those 'southern' states, which do not produce enough income, but seem to prosper and relax on doubtful monetary confidence? The answer is sraightforward and painful. Suddenly, the Eurocrisis presents itself prominently on the economic world stage. Regrettably preparing there to stay, because of its long making, and its misty temporary ECB-solution - another smoke screen, that will not last. Suppressing for some time the symptoms, but failing to correct the fundamental causes of monetary instability..
The American Van Loon lesson is obvious. If Europe wants to recover from its looming deepening of that Eurocrisis, it will have to refrain drastically from its current centralization attempts of Brussels. Instead, it will have to fully revert to its original dynamics, and focus again and primarily on the basic European economic drive - the energies of its separate member states.
Let there be no doubt that in the end everyone will agree of some form of a united Europe. However, its progress towards the far future must be determined step by step. That is one by one, through emerging needs. These should obviously surpass subsidiarity, and therefore fulfill each time an upcoming requirement. A requirement, that cannot be met in any way by the member states. Therefore, each new measure must explicitly clarify these supernational criteria.
Yet, also and far reaching, all existing measures should be reconsidered for their central functionality. That is, because we all know of those European-subsidized projects, where money spending and efficiency do not seem to play any role in the process. A situation no member state could allow to sustain. For the money has been paid by its people, and not by some central office in Brussels.